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Collective  bargaining  and  dispute  resolution  mechanisms  facilitate  coordination.
Coordination  is  increasingly seen  as  an  influential  determinant  of  labor  market  and
macroeconomic performance. This  paper provides  a  systematic  review  of  the  relevant
literature  with  a  specific focus  on the role that  collective  bargaining  plays in  shaping
macroeconomic performance. We focus on comparative studies of labor market institutions
in the OECD area that try to disentangle the impact of different institutional approaches to
collective bargaining from other determinants of macroeconomic performance.
Keywords: Collective bargaining, unions, and macroeconomic performance.
JEL classification: J5 and E24.The Cost and Benefits of Collective Bargaining: A Survey*
1  INTRODUCTION
Collective  bargaining and  dispute resolution mechanisms  facilitate  coordination.
Coordination  is  increasingly seen  as  an  influential  deterninant  of  labor  market  and
macroeconomic performance (see, e.g., World Bank, 1995), and can take many forms.  For
example, the Japanese system of wage setting is decentralized (firm based) but coordinated in
the sense that it follows company rules based on seniority rather than individual contracting.
The  Netherlands and  Germany also have coordinated systems through  strong employer
organizations,  coordination between giant  companies or  across  industries,  and  between
unions. Coordination in France is through the government in the form of public services,
utilities and large nationalized industries.  In Italy, there is informal employer coordination
(via  the  big  firms  and  regional  employers'  associations)  and  between  some  union
confederations. Finally, centralized employers' organizations as well  as centralized union
confederations have dominated Sweden and more generally Scandinavian labor markets. It is
clear from these examples that the specific institutions and the extent  to  which pay and
work  conditions  are  determined  by  collective  agreements  as  opposite  to  individual
contracts differ quite a lot across the OECD. These differences combined with the observed
differences  in  macroeconomic performance  (primarily in  terms  of  unemployment  and
inflation) between the OECD countries over the last 30 years has spurred a large literature
that  try  to  explain  cross-country variation  in  economic  performance  by  cross-country
differences in labor market institutions.
The purpose of this paper is to provide a systematic review of this literature. We
focus on comparative studies of labor market institutions in the OECD area that try to
*The authors are Toke Aidt, Faculty  of Economics  and Politics,  University  of Cambridge,  Cambridge,
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Managing  Director,  Office  of the President,  at the World  Bank.
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should  not be attributed  in any  manner  to the World  Bank or its affiliated  institutions.disentangle the impact of different institutional  approaches to collective bargaining from
other determinants  of macroeconomic  performance.  A central  theme  is whether  or not
coordination of collective bargaining can enhance economic performance, in a static sense
by intemalising externalities and facilitating coordination and in dynamic sense by helping
the economy to absorb shocks more effectively. The reality is complex but some general
lessons can, nevertheless,  be drawn.  First,  bargaining  coordination  and other aspects of
collective bargaining matter most  in times of rapid economic and social change, while in
"norrnal  times"  the  differences  appear  to  contribute  little  to  comparative  economic
performance. One interpretation of this is that bargaining coordination, not only through
formal centralization of collective bargaining but also through more informal mechanisms,
enables the labor market to coordinate  its responds to shocks and to move the economy
towards  a  new  equilibrium  relatively  fast.  Second,  complementarity  between  different
aspects of the institutions that define how collective bargaining is conducted is essential for
our  understanding  of  the  macroeconomic  impact.  One  example  is  that  bargaining
coordination  can  compensate  for  the  negative  impact  of  bargaining  coverage  on
unemployment performance. Another is that informal coordination often develops in labor
markets where formal coordination of bargaining is absent. This implies that it is the total
"package" of (formal and  informal)  institutions  that  matters for  economic performance.
Third, systems of coordination are neither easily replicable nor necessarily a panacea.  The
degree and  kind of  coordination achieved in  each  case are country-specific in terms of
economic conditions  and  institutional  and  cultural  characteristics.  In  most  countries,
coordination evolves gradually through  piecemeal legislation over the  course of decades
rather than as massive policy  intervention at  a  specific point  in  time.  Of  course, labor
regulation introduced at a point in time when particular circumstances prevailed needs to be
reconsidered when economic conditions change.  Most of the countries with coordinated
systems, especially in Europe, are in  a process of change. This  is partly because of their
failure to take account of the international trade performance of their countries and their
exposure to external competition, and partly because of the declining trend in manufacturing
where collective bargaining is more common than in white collar sectors.
2The rest  of the survey  is organized as follows.  In section 2. we provide a short
survey of the  relevant theoretical  literature  and  identify  a  number of channels through
which collective bargaining  can affect  economic outcomes.  In section 3, we review, in
detail, the empirical evidence. To systematize the discussion, we undertake, for part of the
material, a "meta-analysis" of the underlying studies. In section 4, we summarize the more
specific findings of the survey.
2  THE  THEORY  OF COLLECTIVE  BARGAINING
Unions  and  employers'  organizations  arise  from  the  asymmetry  in  contracting
between individual workers and employers, the concern for basic labor rights, and different
perceptions about the merits of employment relations governed by individual contracts and
collective agreements. The desirability of collective bargaining depends on many factors,
including
*  What unions and employers do.
*  The effectiveness of dispute resolution mechanisms.
*  How collective bargaining is organized.
2.1  WHAT DO UNIONS  DO?
2.1.  1  The monopoly cost of unions
Traditionally, economists have focused on the social costs of unions, arising when
they secure favorable pay and work conditions for their members by sharing supernormal
profits  with  firms  (Booth,  1995).  Supernormal  profits  are,  typically,  associated  with
product market distortions and/or government regulation and so labor market and product
market distortions are often viewed as complements. Unions can force firms to give up
some of their profits only if they can monopolize labor supply.' This is because of the strike
threat:  firms  are  willing  to  give  up  some  of their  profits  to  avoid  industrial conflict.
Competition  from  a  large  nonunionized  labor  market  reduces  the  union's  monopoly
' Some  rents  are capitalized  in the value  of the firm  and so, not  available  for sharing.  This  effect  can  be
illustrated  as follows.  Assume  as a result of an innovation  a monopoly  situation  is established.  If the prospect
for high profits  is real, a likely course of events is for the inventor  to sell the right and make a large capital
gain  instantaneously.  Thereafter  sales grow  and the firm reverts  to a public  company.  The monopoly  power  of
the company  is now reflected  in the value of its shares, not in the rate of operating  profit. It is the rate of
return to the shares  (in the form of dividends  and capital gains)  that is relevant  for collective  bargaining  and
this is determined  competitively  in the stock market. Hence,  the ability of the firm  to hand out high wages  to
its labor  force  has gone (Sapsford  and Tzannatos,  1993).command over labor supply and if nonunion workers can readily replace union workers,
the union's  bargaining  position is substantially weakened (Ulph and Ulph,  1990). When
unions succeed, they impose, according to this view, a number of costs on society, which
we may call the monopoly costs of unions:
*  Firms will try to pass on the wage demands to consumers as higher prices. This
increases the consumer price index and reduces the real (consumption) wage of all
workers.  It  also  increases  the  real  price  of  intermediate  inputs  harming  other
producers.  These  effects  are  comparatively small  if  firms  operate  in  a  highly
competitive (product) market environment.
*  The wage mark-up increases the relative price of labor in the union sector. This
induces a  reallocation of labor to the nonunion sector as firms  decide to  lay-off
unionized workers (Rees,  1963). This tends to reduce the nonunion wage and the
welfare of nonunion members and leads to an output loss because workers are niow
being  employed  where  their  marginal  productivity  is  lower  than  before  (see
Sapsford and  Tzannatos,  1993: 325-28). These effects are mitigated  in  the case
where  unions  and  firms  bargain  over  wages  and  employment  (McDonald  and
Solow,  1981), as  employment increases  rather than  decreases in  the  unionized
sector, thereby reducing the negative spill-over on non-unionized sectors.
*  Unionized firms share their profits with the union. This creates a hold up problem
that reduces investments in physical capital and R&D in unionized firms below the
socially optimal level (Grout, 1984).
*  The more senior members, who typically have a disproportional influence on the
decisions  of  the  union,  may institutionalize  a  seniority principle  in  relation  to
layoffs and other aspects of deployment such as promotion, recall and training. Ihis
can create  insider/outsider dynamics that  can lead to  persistently high  levels of
unemployment.
The discussion  of the monopoly costs of unions is often based  on the (implicit)
assumption that the labor market in the absence of collective bargaining would be guided
by Adam Smith's  invisible hand. This assumption is overly optimistic as the "removal" of
unions  may  reveal  market  imperfections on  the  labor  demand  side  in  the  form  of
monopsony. 2 Under these circumstances, the presence of unions may offer a second-best
alternative to  free  competition  and the  countervailing influence of unions  can result  in
2Employers  derive  monopsony  power from  the fact  that it is costly  for a worker  to leave the firm (because  of
the firm-specific  human  capital he or she has  accumulated)  and move  to another  city to get a new similar  job.
4outcomes closer to the competitive equilibrium than is offered by competition on the supply
side of the labor market and monopsony on the demand side. 3
2.1.2  Participatory benefit of unions
The "organizational  view"  focuses on the economic benefits of unions  (Freeman
and Medoff, 1979; 1984; and Freeman, 1980a). Unions facilitate worker participation and
worker-manager cooperation at the workplace. This can have efficiency-enhancing effects
to  the joint  benefit of  workers and  management. More  specifically, these participatory
benefits can arise from many sources:
*  Unions are institutions of collective voice operating within internal labor markets.
One role of the union within this framework is to communicate the preferences of
workers directly to the management, and to participate in the establishment of work
rules and seniority provisions. This changes the exit-voice-trade-off of workers by
providing  a  channel  through  which  they  can express  their  grievances  without
having to leave the firm. This reduces turnover (voting with the feet), increases the
incentive  of  employers to  provide firm-specific training  and  facilitates  long-run
working relationships to the benefit of all parties. In addition, unions can also help
establish  seniority  provisions,  one  effect of  which  is to  lessen  rivalry  between
experienced and inexperienced workers. This can increase the amount of informal,
on-the-job training that the former is willing to provide to the latter (Freeman and
Medoff, 1979; 1984).
*  Unions  help  enforce  contracts  between workers and  management  (Malcomson,
1983). For example, in the presence of uncertainty about product market  demand,
workers may be reluctant to acquire firm-specific skills unless the firm can promise
not to  fire them  if demand turns out to be low. Without a credible enforcement
mechanism, the firm cannot make such a promise and too few firm-specific skills
are acquired. A union can, however, help to enforce the promise if the firm prefers
to stick to the implicit agreement rather than getting involved in a strike.
*  Unions can increase productivity by providing a channel through which labor can
draw  to  management's  attention  changes  in  working  methods  or  production
techniques that may be beneficial to both parties.  In addition, this channel  also
offers a mechanism by which the union can "shock" the management  into better
practices (reduce X-inefficiency).
3  Many  more imperfections are  likely to coexist with unionism some arising from motivational problems
(efficiency wages) others from insider power (Lindbeck and Snower, 1989).
52.1.3  Unions as political organizations
Unions represent the special interests of their members in collective bargaining and
in the political process. As pointed out by Pencavel (1995), unions generally promote rent-
creating policies  that  reduce  competition  in  labor  and  product  markets.  This  inclludes
support to  minimum wage legislation, trade protection  and  so on.  Unions support  such
policies  because  they  increase  the  surplus  available  for  sharing  (the  effect  of  less
competitive product markets) or increase their bargaining  power  (less competition  from
nonunion  labor markets). 4 The social  cost  of  such rent-seeking  can be  counteracted  in
situations  where  unions  encompass  a  large  fraction  of  society  and  play  a  (socially)
beneficial  role in  a  social partnership  with  government  and  business  (see,  e.g.,  Olson,
1982). It is clear from this that all forms of collective bargaining are not equally desirable
and that different reactions to broader policy issues such as trade reforms arise from the way
costs and benefits are generated  and distributed in different institutional settings.
2.2  WHAT  DO  EMPLOYERS'  ORGANIZATIONS  DO?
Employers'  organizations organize firms, typically within a particular industry, and
represent  them  in  collective  bargaining  with  unions.  A  firm  may  decide  to  join  an
employers'  organization to  improve  its  bargaining  position  with  workers. Firms  derive
bargaining power from their ability to lock out workers. The cost of an industrial conflict
from the point of view of an individual firm is larger than the cost to  the industry as a
whole. This is because an individual firm involved in a strike is likely to lose its market
share to other firms in the industry that produce close substitutes. Accordingly, while each
firm has an incentive to give in to wage demands (to avoid local conflicts), the industry as
a whole has less incentive to do so, and by joining  forces, it is easier for firms to resist
wage demands from unions (see Dowrick, 1993).
In addition, employers' organizations can help firms to avoid leap frogging. Leap
frogging arises  when individual firms increase  their  wage rate in  order to  extract more
effort from existing workers or to attract skilled workers from other firms (Layard et al,
4With  regard to regulation  of the product  market,  the union and the firm have a common  interest, and they
may form a very effective  distributional  coalition  (Rama, 1997; Rama and Tabellini, 1997). On the other
hand, with respect to labor market  regulations  such as job security legislation  and minimum  wages, they
disagree.
61991). When all firms engage in this kind  of behavior, the net result may well be that
relative wages are unchanged, but  the level  of all wages has  increased  substantially. A
strong employers'  organization that coordinates  the behavior of  individual firms can be
helpful in internalizing this "efficiency wage externality" and preventing wage drift.
Finally, employers' organizations play an important role in the provision of training
(Soskice, 1990). Since general training is a public good, firms are unlikely to provide much
of it unless they are subject to external pressure. A strong employers'  organization provide
facilities to firms for training their workers and can impose sanctions if a firm does not pay
its share of the cost.
2.3  DISPUTE  RESOLUTION
The breakdown of negotiations between individual workers and their employers can
take various forms ranging from  "poor"  relations  at the workplace (with  potential costs
including decreased levels of labor productivity through poor morale) to labor turnover (the
"exit" option, with the potential loss to the employer of previously made investments in his
workers' human capital). At the level of collective contracting, the stakes are arguably much
higher for both workers (and their unions) and for employers, with the ultimate  cost of a
negotiation breakdown being lost incomes to the workers and lost profits to employers. Given
the potentially high level of these costs to both  of the contracting parties, it is likely that
workers and employers have a strong incentive to achieve a solution in preference to conflict.
Like all good threats, the employer's threat of a lock-out and the union's of a strike are best if
they ensure that an agreement is reached while remaining unused.
In  real life, collective bargaining  sometimes breaks down,  and production,  labor
earnings, and profits are lost.  It is certainly not safe to assume that the total of such costs is
greater under the collective bargaining system than under the individual contracting system.
We simply do not know whethel these costs to  society are greater or less than those that
would arise from a breakdown in individual employer-employee pay negotiations.  Indeed,
given economies of  scale in  the production  and dissemination of information, there are
grounds for believing that the collective system, through its ability to resolve disputes, may
be a less costly option from a social point of view than individual contracting.
7There  is  a  strong  presumption  that  when  disputes  do  occur  under  collective
bargaining, this  is because  of asymmetries in the information possessed by the involved
parties  (Hicks,  1932).  A  common  example  is  when the  trade  union  "misjudges"  the
maximum wage that the employer is willing or able to pay.  Under such circumstances, the
existence of  regulation can prove  decisive  in  resolving disputes through its  information
gathering and disseminating roles.
To  understand the process, it is important to recognize the distinction between the
union proper (sometimes called the official union) and its rank and file membership.  Under
this tripartite framework, the official union (often as a well-informed professional body) acts
as an intermediary between the union membership and the employer. As such, its role is:  to
reconcile the aspirations of  the former against what it judges  (on the basis of its  more
complete knowledge of the overall situation than that possessed by the union membership)
that the employer would agree to pay.  This reconciliation between worker aspirations and
labor market  "realities"  may  be  achieved  without  either  party having to  resort  to  its
'no-trade"  sanction.  However, should negotiations break down and a dispute occur, the role
of the official union as a purveyor of information continues, with information being passed in
both directions regarding concessions acceptable to each party and any new information that
may materialize as the dispute progresses.  This transmission of information continues until
demands fall into balance with offers, at which time a settlement is achieved.
Viewing  trade unions in this  way, as an information gathering and disseminating
body, suggests that governments might want to adopt policies that increase the efficacy with
which unions fill this role. The introduction of so-called "cooling-off' periods, during which
all parties take time to make a full assessment of the situation before implementing no-trade
strategies, is  one  such  example.  Other  such  policies might  require that the  employer
(generally seen as the party in possession of more complete information) divulges to  the
union and its members certain types of informnation,  perhaps in a standard form, so as to
mninimize  the possibility that disputes will arise because workers incorrectly estimate the
employer's ability to pay. Recognizing this, there are grounds for believing that a centralized,
union-based system of wage bargaining may be less costly to  society than an individually
8based negotiating system in terms of both total transactions costs and dispute costs.  We have
also seen that unions have a role in resolving disputes if they should occur.
2.4  THE ORGANISATION  OF COLLECTIVE  BARGAINING
The  cost  and  benefits  of  collective  bargaining  depend  significantly  on  the
organization of the labor market.  Of particular  interest  here is the  degree of bargaining
coordination  and  the  share  of  the  labor  market  covered  by  collective  agreements as
opposite to individual wage contracts. Many complementary aspects of the labor market,
including  those  of  bargaining  centralization,  corporatism  and  informal  coordination
determine the degree of bargaining coordination.
2.4.1  Centralization of collective bargaining
Collective bargaining is centralized when the national union confederation and the
national employers' organization can influence and control wage levels and patterns across
the economy. The capacity to  do  so depends  on many factors, including  i) the  level at
which bargaining primarily takes place (the plant, the industry or the national level) and ii)
whether or not the national organization(s) can control the behavior  of their  constituent
organizations  and  avoid  wage  drift.  Table  1  sumrnmaries  eight  important  aspects  of
bargaining centralization and evaluates the associated (static) costs and benefits.
9Table  1. The Economic Costs and  Benefits of Centralization  of Collective Bargaining
Issue  Benefit  Cost
1.  Intemalization  of  extemalities:  Unions  and  firms  Centralization  increases the size of
acting  independently  of  the  rest  of  the  market  the  bargaining  coalition,  thereby
(decentralization)  can have unintended negative effects  intemalizing  negative externalities.
(extemalities)  upon  the  rest  of  the  economy  (e.g.  This  effect  is  larger,  the  more
higher  wages  can  be  passed on  to  consumers  in the  workers are unionized.
form of higher  prices;  higher inflation;  an increase in
unemployment)
2.  Competitive  pressure:  Competition  in  product  As bargaining becomes more centralized,
markets disciplines  unions and firms, and this effect is  competitive  pressure is  reduced  because
strongest  at  decentralized  level  (more  competition  firms  acting in  unison  are  less likely  to
reduces  the  ability  to  pass  wage  increases  on  to  lose their market  share (product  demand
consumers as higher prices).  is more inelastic at the industry level than
at  the  firm level).  This  increases  wage
pressure  and  leads  to  higher
unemployment.  This  effect  is  less
important in an open economy.
3.  Wage  compression:  Under  centralized  collective  Although  wage  compression  can  A reduction  in  wage dispersion leads to
bargaining,  egalitarian  wage  goals  are  easier  to  force less efficient firms out of the  an  economic  misallocation  of  resources
achieve, and firm-specific  conditions  are less likely to  market  (to  the  extent  that  low  and lower output.
enter the wage  contracts.  This tends  to reduce  wage  wages  move  upwards),  it  can
diispersion.  encourage  the  entry of new/more
efficient firms:  the  net effect can,
under  certain  conditions,  increase
output.  Again  under  certain
assumptions,  wage  compression
can  act  as  a  form  of  social
insurance.
4.  Areas  of  Bargaining:  Some  issues  can  only  be  For  example,  general  training  of  Efficient  bargaining  (over  emplovmnent
subject  to  collective  bargaining  at  certain  levels  of  workers is more likely to be part of  and  wages)  is  only  feasible  under
centralization  or  above  (training,  health  and safety,  centralized  collective  bargaining  decentralized bargaining.
and so on).  because it has the characteristics of  Work  place  co-operation  and  other
a  public  good.  Subsequently,  participatory  activities  between  unions
training  can  lead  to  higher  and  firms  decreases  under  centralized
economy-wide  labor  productivity  bargaining.
and overall economic growth.
5.  Hold-up,  problems:  Firms  undertake  investment  The  hold-up  problem  is  reduced
decisions today  that affect  future profits.  If workers,  under  centralized  bargaining
via  collective  bargaining,  can  get  a  share  of  these  because  an individual firm cannot
Frofits without  contributing to  the costs, firms would  affect  the  outcome  of  collective
under-invest.  bargaining  by  its  pre-bargaining
investment  decisions.  This
encourages firms to invest more.
6.  Insider-Induced  Hysteresis:  Only  the  group  of  Under  centralized  bargaining,
insiders (e.g.  union  members  and employed workers)  more workers can  be perceived to
counts  in  wage  bargaining.  When  the  insiders  are  be  insiders  (including  the
reduced  in  number (e.g.,  after layoffs  in a recession),  unemployed)  to  the  extent  that
they can push  for higher wages in the next bargaining  unions  are  concemed  about
round and cause unemployment to remain  persistently  aggregate unemployment.
high (insider-induced hysteresis).
7  Strikes:  Imperfect  information  can  lead  to  more  Centralization  increases  the  level  Centralization  increases  the  risk  of  a
strikes.  of  information  about  demand  general strike.
conditions,  thereby  reducing  the
likelihood  of  strikes,  especially
wild-cat strikes.
8. Bargaining power:  The relative bargaining power of  Centralization  can  reduce  wage  Centralization  can increase wage pressure
workers  and  employers  depends  on  the  "fall-back"  pressure  by increasing  employers'  if  unions  derive their  bargaining  power
option  of  the  two  parties  (what  they  will  get if  an  bargaining  power  because  from the monopoly command over  labor
agreement is not reached).  workers'  altemative job  options in  supply. It is easier for a single firm than it
case  of  an  industrial  conflict  are  is  for  an  entire  industry  or  nation  to
substantially  reduced  if  all  firms  replace workers in the event of a strike.
"lock-out" workers.
Sources: Besides  the  surveys by Calmfors  (1993),  Moene  and Wallerstein  (1993a), Layard et al (1991:  chapter 2) and Henley and
Tsakalotos (1993).  the following references  are relevant:  (1) and (2)  Calmfors and Drifill (1988);  (3) Agell and Lommerud (1993),
Moene and Wallerstein  (1993b; 1993c) and Agell (1998); (4) Soskice (1990); (5) Grout (1984); (6) Blanchard and Summers (1986).
10The idea that centralization of collective bargaining can facilitate internalization of
externalities has received particular attention in the literature and warrants a more detailed
discussion  than the one given in the Table. To fix ideas, imagine a society in which all
workers are organized in unions. Suppose that each firm negotiates with a company union.
In this case, wage-setters only bear a (small) fraction of the total economic cost associated
with a given increase in their real wage as they impose external costs on others. Table 2
defines, in  more detail, six such  externalities. Due to these externalities, the negotiated
wage  is "too"  high  and the result  is,  ceteris paribus,  "too"  little total  employment. By
centralizing the bargaining process to the industry or national level, wage-setters are forced
to bear a  larger share of the cost  of their  actions, as more (and  ultimately all) workers
become  included  in  the bargaining  coalition. This  creates  incentives in  favor  of wage
restraint, which, ceterisparibus,  leads to more total employment.
Table 2. Five Important Externalities Associated with Decentralized Wage Setting.
The input  price externality  Decentralized  wage gains are passed on as higher  product  prices,
thus increasing  the real cost of inputs  for other firms.
The fiscal externality  Decentralized wage gains lead to unemployment.  The cost in
terms of unemployment  benefits is born by all tax-payers, not
______  _only  those involved  in wage setting.
The unemployment  Decentralized wage  gains  increase  overall  unemployment,
externality  making it more difficult for all unemployed  workers to find a
new  job.
The envy externality  Decentralized  wage  gains create  envy among  other  workers.
The consumer  price  Decentralized  wage  gains are passed on as higher  product  prices,
externality  thus lowering  the real wage of all workers.
Efficiency  wage externality  At the decentralized level, firms have an  incentive to try to
increase the relative wage of their workers to  increase their
motivation.
Note: See Calrnfors  (1993:  5-6).
As pointed out by Calmfors and Driffill (1988), this argument ignores the fact that
the competitive pressure from product markets and the moderating effect it has on wage
demands changes systematically with the level of centralization. To see this, consider what
happens when a union demands (and gets) a high nominal wage. To avoid an increase in
the product real wage, firms pass the cost on to consumers as higher prices. From the point
of view of the union, this has an unpleasant side effect in addition to the reduction in the
11consumption real wage: it reduces the demand for the goods produced by the host firm,
thereby endangering the jobs of the union members. Anticipating this, the union moderates
its wage demand. At the firm level, the competitive pressure from other firms in the same
industry (producing close substitutes) provides strong incentives to moderate demands. At
the  national  level,  the  federation of  unions  bear  the  full  cost  of  its  actions,  social
partnerships becomes possible and unions  and employers'  organizations are sufficiently
encompassing to make rent-seeking unprofitable (Olson, 1982; and Heitger, 1987). At the
industry level, neither of these effects produces much wage moderation. On the contrary,
firms in an industry can pass on a substantial portion of the wage demands to consumers at
a relatively low employment cost. In addition, industry-based unions often form effective
lobby groups that seek distributive favors from the government at the expense of society at
large.
It follows from this discussion that the relationship between economic performance
and  centralization  of  collective  bargaining  can  be  non-linear  (U-  or  Hump-shaped):
relatively good performance for decentralized and centralized systems, but relatively poor
performance for systems based on industry-level bargaining (Calmfors and Driffill, 1988).
It should be noted, however, that this prediction is  sensitive to many of the underlying
assumptions. For example, Rama (1994) and Danthine and Hunt (1994) show that the non-
linear relationship tends to disappear in an open economy as competitive pressure becomes
more intense at all levels of bargaining. It is also clear that centralization will not help to
internalize external costs unless most workers are union members  or have their  pay and
work conditions determined by collective agreements.  More critical,  perhaps,  is the fact
that the analysis takes a static view on the economy. Arguably, one of the key advantages
of a  centralized bargaining system is that it enables  a coordinated  and fast response  to
changing economic conditions.
To see this important point more clearly, consider the following (simplistic) New
Keynesian model of the labor market. 5 The product and the labor markets are imperfectly
competitive.  In  the  labor market, workers  are organized  in  (firm-specific)  unions  that
determine the nominal wage (W), while firms determine the price (P) of the (differentiated)
5  See Carlin  and Soskice  (1990, chapter  16),  Layard  and  Nickell (1986) and Rowthorm  (1977).
12good  that  produce  as  a  mark-up on  wages.  Workers  set  the  nominal  wage  based  on
expectations about the price level to achieve a particular real wage target. This is illustrated
in Figure 1 by the BRW (bargained real wage) line. It is upwards sloping in employment
(E) real wage (W/P) space because unions hold  more bargaining power  in a tight labor
market and thus adjust their aspirations accordingly. Firms, on the other hand, set prices to
achieve a real profit target. This is shown in the Figure as the PRW (price real wage) line.
For  simplicity,  we  assume  that  the  real  profit  target  is  constant  over  the  cycle.  A
macroeconomic equilibrium arises when the aspirations of the two parties are consistent
and that defines the equilibrium level of employment  and as a residual, the equilibrium
level of unemployment (the NAIRU). In the Figure, we have drawn three different BRW
curves, reflecting the three levels of centralization of bargaining (the firm, the industry and
the national level). The particular location of the three curves  and so of the equilibrium
level  of employment captures the static  gains  of  centralization  and  decentralization,  as
discussed  in  detail  above.  The  subtle  thing  to  notice  is  that  wage  setters  are  more
responsive to changes in employment under decentralized and centralized bargaining (there
is more real wage flexibility) than under industry-based bargaining. This makes the BRW
curve steeper in the two former cases than in the latter. This has an important implication
for the response of the labor market to a negative shock under the three regimes. Suppose,
for example, that the economy is being hit by a negative (productivity) shock that shifts the
PRW  curve down. We see, from the Figure, that  the employment loss is modest  under
centralized (and decentralized) bargaining compared to industry-level bargaining. In short,
a centralized labor market insulates the economy from the impact of negative shocks. In
addition, by facilitating coordination of expectation and by taking a broader view on those
interest should be represented in the bargaining (being more encompassing in the sense of
Olson, 1982), it can achieve a faster adjustment to the new equilibrium position and reduce
hysteresis effects. This is particularly helpful when the shock reverses and the economy is
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2.4.2  Corporatism
T'he idea  that  the  labor  market  parties  in  a  centralized  bargaining  system  can
coordinate their responses to economic shocks is one of the  cornerstones of corporatism.
The term  corporatism  often  refers  to  situations  in  which  the  economic and  political
activities  of  unions  and  employers'  organizations  take  place  within  a  well-defined
framework of social partnership  between workers, capitalists,  and government (see, e.g.,
Cameron, 1984; Tarantelli,  1986; Bruno and  Sacks,  1985; Henley and Tsakalotos,  1993;
and Lehmbruch, 1984). Within this framework, labor market  parties, in particular unions,
expect the government to deliver certain welfare goods and policies  in exchange for wage
restraint  (Lange  and  Garrett,  1985).  In  addition,  social  partnership  can  create  social
consensus and  reduce  the  level  of  conflict  at the  labor market.  It reduces the cost  of
implementing economic  reforms  when they are needed  and  helps  mitigate coordination
failures arising when, in the face of changing economic conditions, the economy needs to
move from  one equilibrium  to  another. It also  facilitates income  policy, economy-wide
14agreements on wages and weekly hours, health and safety standards and so on. All of these
aspects help to bring about "good" economic outcomes. It is, however, important to notice
that  social partnerships  have  a  tendency  to  break  apart.  The  point  is  simple:  unions,
employers'  organizations  and individual  firms have  an incentive to  free ride and break
away from  their  respective  confederations to  act  on their own. Accordingly, to sustain
corporatism  over  longer  periods  of  time,  some  glue  is needed to  keep the bargaining
coalitions together.
2.4.3  Informal coordination
While the glue that keeps bargaining coalitions together is predominately embodied
in  the  formal  institutions  of  collective  bargaining,  informal  mechanisms  sometimes
develop to sustain cooperation among labor market parties. These mechanisms are much
more fragile than those  embodied in the formal institutions  and so, more likely to break
down,  in  times  of  rapid  economic  change  or  instability,  when they are most  needed.
Informal  coordination  can take many  forms.  One form  is  internal coordination among
employers  andlor the  employees  made  possible  by  repeated interaction  and reputation
effects. At the employer side this involves coordination between industry-based employers'
organizations  or  individual  firms.  This  plays  an  important role in  Japan,  Austria,  and
Switzerland  (Soskice,  1990; OECD, 1994). At the employee side, internal coordination,
typically,  involves coordination  between  company- and  industry-based unions.  Another
form of informal coordination is pattern bargaining. Here, a dominant industry or company
enters a collective agreement that is followed by other firms and industries. This has been
important in, e.g., Germany, where the metal industry, traditionally, has acted as the leader.
3  COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE - THE
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
We now turn to the review of the available empirical evidence that in different ways
throws light on the macroeconomic impact of collective bargaining. We focus exclusively
on comparative evidence from the OECD area. The survey builds on Aidt and Tzannatos
(1999), where we, in addition, discuss the (limited) evidence deriving from other countries
and regions than the OECD area, and should be seen as a complement to Flanagan (1999).
153.1  INDICATORS
The institutions of collective bargaining shape economic outcomes by propagating
shocks  and by creating or eliminating distortions.  To evaluate the  impact of  collective
bargaining on macroeconomic performance, different aspects of the underlying institutions
have to be defined and measured along with indicators of macroeconomic performance.
3.1.1  Macroeconomic performance indicators
Ideally,  we would like to  measure the  impact of collective bargaining  on  social
welfare.  Short of any good measure of social welfare, we can think  of macroeconomic
performance as a reasonable proxy. The prevalent approach in the literature is to assume
that macroeconomic performance can be measured by individual sub-outcomes, such as the
unemployment  rate,  the  employment  rate,  inflation,  wage  dispersion,  and  GDP  and
productivity growth. Some studies have simultaneously tried to measure different  aspects
of economic performance by means of a  performance index, such as Okun 's index (the sum
of the  unemployment  rate  and  inflation) or  the  open  economy  index  (the  sum  of the
unemployment  rate  and  current account deficit as  a percentage of  GDP). 6 Others  (e.g.,
Jackman et al,  1990; and Scarpetta, 1996) use indicators of the degree of  labor market
flexibility (such as real wage flexibility and search effectiveness).
3.1.2  Indicators of collective bargaining
The  empirical  literature  focuses  on  three  measurable  aspects  of  collective
bargaining: Union density, bargaining coverage and bargaining coordination. Union density
and bargaining coverage are relatively simple to define and measure (see Table 3) and go
some way in measuring the "importance" of collective agreements as opposed to individual
contracts, though they can hardly be seen as indicators of union power because spill-over
effects are not accounted for. 7
6 See Caimfors  and Driffill  (1988)  for further  discussion.
7For  instance,  firms in non-covered  sectors  may set wages  at the collectively  agreed level to avoid being
subject to other effects of unionization  or to motivate  workers  concerned  about relative wages  (Pancavel,
1991;  and Mazumdar,  1993).
16Table 3. Definitions of Union Density and Bargaining Coverage
Union  densitv  The number of workers  who are members  of a union, as a percentage  of all
workers,  unionized  and non-unionized.
Bargaining  The number of workers, unionized or not, which have their pay and
coverage  employment conditions determined by  a  collective agreement, as  a
Ipercentage  of all workers,  unionized  and non-unionized.I
Note:  Depending  on the study,  "all  workers"  refers  to all wage  and  salary  workers  (employees)  or total  labor
force  (employees  plus  self-employed,  family  workers,  and  so on).
Table  4 shows union density and bargaining coverage for  19 OECD countries in
1970,  1980, and  1994. Average union density  increased from 43 percent to  47 percent
during  the 1970s but  declined during the  1980s and  1990s to 40 percent. However, the
average hides a lot of variation. Some countries, such as the US, the UK, Japan, and the
Netherlands,  have experienced a  significant reduction  in union density. Other countries,
such  as  Finland  and  Sweden,  have  experienced  a  significant increase  over  the  three
decades. Also, the cross-country variation is significant. Countries such as France, the US,
and Spain have very low union density rates (less than 30 percent). On the other hand, the
Scandinavian  countries  have  very  high  rates  (all  above  50  percent,  some  around  80
percent).
Bargaining  coverage  is  on  average  much  higher  than  union  density  and  was
relatively constant around 70 percent during the period.  While high union density leads to
high  coverage  of  collective  bargaining,  Table  4  shows  that  the  converse  is  not  true.
Countries  such as  Spain  and  France have very  low union  density, yet the coverage of
collective agreements is very high. The difference between union density and the coverage
of  collective  bargaining  is  largely  attributed  to  mandatory  extensions  of  collective
agreements to non-unionized sectors (OECD, 1994).
17Table 4. Union Density and Bargaining Coverage in Selected OECD Countries
Union  density  Bargaining  coverage
County  1970  1980  1994  1980  1990  1994
Australia  50  48  41  88  80  80
Austria  62  56  42  98  98  98
Belgium  46  56  54  90  90  90
Canada  31  36  38  37  38  38
Denmark  60  76  76  69  69  69
Finland  51  70  81  95  95  95
France  22  18  9  85  92  95
Germany  33  36  29  91  90  92
Italy  36  49  39  85  83  82
Japan  35  31  24  28  23  21
Netherlands  38  35  26  76  71  81
New Zealand  n.a.  56  30  67  67  31
Norway  51  57  58  75  75  74
Portugal  61  61  32  70  79  71
Spain  27  19  19  76  76  78
Sweden  68  80  91  86  86  89
Switzerland  30  31  27  53  53  50
UK  45  50  34  70  47  47
US  23  22  16  26  18  18
Average  43  47  40  72  70  68
Source: Freeman (1988) and OECD (1997a, Table 3.3).
Bargaining coordination is much harder to measure empirically than union density
and bargaining coverage. To obtain empirical measures, the literature has focused  on six
(related) aspects of bargaining coordination, which are summarized in Table 5. Based on
one or more of these aspects, the degree of bargaining coordination in individual OECD
countries is assessed and a ranking or classification is derived.
18Table 5. Aspects of Bargaining Coordination
A. Unions  The capacity of the national union confederation to influence wage
centralization  levels/patterns  across  the economy.
B. Union  Union concentration  is high if "few" unions at the relevant level of
concentration  bargaining  are representing  workers.
C. Employer  The capacity of the national employers' confederation to  influence
centralization  wage levels/patterns  across  the economy.
D. Level of Bargaining  Collective  bargaining  takes place at different levels: the firm level, the
industry  level,  and the regional/national  level.
E. Informal  1) Informal consultations at the industry, regional, or national level
coordination  among  unions  and firms.
2) Pattern bargaining  (an agreement  in a dominant sector is mimicked
by others).
F. Corporatism  A combination  of
1) High union density and bargaining coverage and high degree of
union and employer  centralization/concentration  and
2)  Social partnership between national workers'  and  employers'
organizations  and govermment.
G. Other aspects  This include different types of dispute resolution procedures, the
proportion  of unionized  workers  employed  in sectors that are subject  to
international  competition,  and union density.
Table  6  characterizes the  28  indicators  of  bargaining  coordination  used  in  the
studies surveyed here. Each row provides infornation  on how a particular  indicator has
been constructed.  The first column indicates the source of the study that constructed the
indicator. The second column indicates which aspects of bargaining coordination the study
emphasized.8 Each of the indicators is then given a code name for mnemonic purposes
(column 3).  The subsequent columns are labeled A to  G. They refer  to  the aspects of
coordination,  presented in  Table  5, that  were used  to  construct  the  indicators  in  each
individual  study.  The last two  columns refer respectively to  the  period  for  which  the
indicator  applies  (the  reference period)  and  to  whether  the  study  developed  its  own
indicator of bargaining coordination or utilized/updated an existing one (index used).
8 A detailed  discussion  of each  of the indicators  included  in the  survey  can  be found  in Aidt and Tzannatos
(1999, Appendix  1).
19Table 6. Characterization  of 28 Indicators  of Bargaining  Coordination.
Source/study  Indicator gives emphasis  Indicator  A  B  C  D  E  F  Reference  Index used
on:  Code  period
Dowrick (1993)  Coordination  D1993-2  X  (X)  (X)  X  X  60s. 70s  C 1990-  1.
and 80s  CD1983,
S 1990
Layard et al  Employee coordination  LNJ1991-1  X  X  X  X  80s  Own
(1991)  _  _
Layard et a]  Employer coordination  LNJ1991-2  X  X  X  80s  Own
(1991)  ___  _
Layard et al  Employer and employee  LNJI991-  X  X  X  X  X  80s  LNJ19S  I-1
(1991)  coordination  1/2  LNJ199I-2
OECD (1997)  Coordination  OECD1997-  X  X  X  1980, 1990 Own
2  __  2  and 1994
OECD (1997)  Centralization and informal  OECDI991-  X  X  X  X  1980, 1990 OECD1997-1
coordination  3  and 1994  and
OECD1  997-2
Soskice (1990)  Economy-wide coordination  S1990  X  - X  X  X  1985-90  Own
Blau and Kahn  Centralization  BK1996  X  X  X  X  union  70s  BS1985
(1996)  density  80s  CD1988
C1984-1
__________  ______  Others
Bleaney (1996)  Corporatism and  B 1996  X  X  X  70s  BS1985
centralization  _80s  CD198E
Heitger (1987)  Corporatism  H1987  X  X  X  ___  70s  BS1985
Bruno and Sacks  Corporatism  BS1985  X  X  X  70s  Crouch
(1985)  _  _…_  (1985)
Calmfors and  Centralization  CD 1988  X  X  X  X  80s  Own
Driffill (1988)  1  1
C'ameron  (1984)  Organizational power of  C1984-1  X  X  _  union  1965-80  Own
labor  _  .__  density
Cameron (1984)  Union centralization  C1984-2  X  1965-80  Own
Cameron (1984)  Union concentration  C1984-3  -X  - =  =_=  1965-80  Own
Crouch (1985)  Neo-corporatism  C1985  X  =__=_  70s  Own
Crouch (1990)  Labor movement  C1990  X  X  60s, 70s  Own
centralization  I_  and 80s
Dowrick (1993)  Centralization  D1993-1  X  (X)  (X)  X  60s, 70s  CD1988,
________  and 80s  C1990-1
Lange and  Organizational power of  GL1985  X  X  1965-80  C1984
Garrett (1985)  labor  _  _
McCallum  Corporatism  MC1986  X  X  X  70s  Crouch
(1986)  (1985)
Newell and  Corporatism  NS1987  X  X  X  1955-83  Own
Symons  (1987)  _  _  _  _  _
OECD (1997)  Bargaining centralization  OECD1997-  X  - 1980, 1990 OECD (1994)
I  and 1994
Schmitter (1981)  Corporatism  S1981-1  X  X  60s  Own
I  70s  . -
Schmitter (1981)  Union centralization  S1981-2  X  _  60s  Own
__________________________  _________  _  _70s
Schmitter (1981)  Union concentration  S1981-3  X  60s  Own
I_  70s
Soskice (1990)  Wage drift  S 1990-2  X  _  1985-90  Own
Taranetelli  Neo-corporatism  T1986  X  X  X  X  dispute  70s  Own
(1986)  _  _  settlement
Crouch (1990)  Power of  unions in trade-  C 1990-2  foreign  60s, 70s  Own
exposed sectors  _competition  and 80s  I
Note: A=union centralization, B=union concentration,  C=employer centralization, D=the level of bargaining,  E=informal coordination
among employees and employers, F=corporatism/social partnership, and G: other aspects.
20We notice two things from Table 6. First, most of the indicators combine a cluster
of different aspects of bargaining  coordination and are, therefore, highly correlated. 9 This
makes it difficult to isolate empirically the contribution of individual aspects of bargaining
coordination to macroeconomic performance. Second, although researchers in the area are
familiar with the details of bargaining systems in many different countries, the resulting
rankings of countries involve a large element of subjectivity. Not surprisingly, researchers
often strongly disagree on the ranking of particular  countries (see, for example, Soskice,
1990).
Table 7 presents four indicators of bargaining coordination that are representative
of those found in the literature. A  detailed comparison of the four reveals a number of
interesting similarities and differences. In particular, we notice that it makes a considerable
difference whether  informal  coordination is  accounted for  or not.  Comparing the two
indicators (S1990-1 and OECD1997-2)  that do  take informal  coordination into account
with the two (CD1988 and OECD1997-1) that do not,  we see that Japan switches from
being  among the  most  coordinated  countries  in  the  sample  to  being  among the  least
coordinated ones. Other countries, such as Belgium, move in the opposite direction. It is
also evident that the bargaining institutions  in a few countries have changed significantly
from  1980 to  1994.  For instance, the UK, Australia and New Zealand have become less
coordinated and less centralized, while the opposite is true for Italy and Portugal. However,
for most other countries bargaining institutions have been fairly constant.
9 See Table 16.
21Table 7. Country Rankings Based on Alternative Indicators of Bargaining
Coordination
Count  S1990-_'  CDD1988 2 OECD1  997-l3  OECD1997-2 3
1980s  mid-80s  1980  1990  1994  1980  1990  1994
Australia  10  3  1  14  7  5  15
Austria  2  1  3  1  1  1  1  1
Belgium  8  3  1  1  10  10  9
Canada  ..  17  17  17  16  18  17  16
Denmark  4  3  8  5  4  5  6
Finland  ..  5  2  4  4  7  5  6
France  9  11  8  8  5  13  10  9
Gernany  6  6  8  8  5  1  1  1
Italy  8  13  15  14  5  15  15  4
Japan  1  14  17  17  16  1  1  1
Netherlands  7  7  8  8  5  10  1  0  9
New Zealand  ..  9  8  16  16  15  17  16
Norway  4  2  8  1  1  4  4  4
Portugal  ..  15  1  5  13  10  9
Spain  3  8  5  10  10  9
Sweden  5  3  1  1  5  4  5  9
Switzerland  3  15  8  8  5  7  5  6
UK  10  12  8  14  14  15  16  16
US  11  16  17  17  16  18  17  16
Note: The codes refer  to Table 6. A low rank is an indication  of a high degree  of bargaining  coordination.
(1) See  Soskice  (1990); (2) see Calmfors  and Driffill  (1988);  (3) see OECD  (1997).
3.2  METHODOLOGY
Armed with indictors of collective bargaining and macroeconomic performance. the
relationship between the two can be represented by the following set of equations:
(1)  Yi=  g=,t(Zi,t  ,Xi,,1i'l)
where subscript i refers to a particular country and subscript t refers to a particular point in
time. yi,t is a vector of (observed) performance indicators (such as the unemployment rate
or inflation), zi, is a vector of institutional  indicators (such as union  density, bargaining
coverage  or  bargaining  coordination),  x 1,t  is  a  vector  of  economic,  political,  and
socioeconomic  control  variables  and  ejt is  a disturbance  term.  The function  gi,t  is in
principle unrestricted, i.e., it may be non-linear and non-monotonic.
Broadly speaking, equation (1) has been estimated in three different ways in the
literature.  The  simplest  approach  is  the  correlation  approach,  '  which  estimates  the
'°See, e.g.,  Calmfors  and  Driffill  (1988) and Bruno  and Sacks  (1985).
22relationship between  two particular indictors as a  simple correlation using cross-country
data. This  is obviously a very crude approach. The regression approach"  uses multiple
regression analysis to estimate equation (1), thereby attempting to isolate the impact of a
particular institutional  indicator from that of other determinants. The two-step regression
approach'2 is a more sophisticated version of the regression approach. In the first step, an
economic  model  (such  as  a  system  of  wage  and  price  equations)  is  econometrically
estimated for each country using time series data.  The results are used to obtain estimated
indicators  of  labor  market  flexibility  (such  as  real  wage  flexibility  and  search
effectiveness).  In the second step, the relationship (if any) between the estimated indictors
and bargaining coordination, union density and bargaining coverage is analyzed.
Irrespectively  of  estimation  approach, drawing  inference  about  the  relationship
between collective bargaining and macroeconomic perfornance  is a challenge. First, the
data material is limited and a few outliners can significantly bias the results. Most studies
are based on a sample of 10-20 observations from OECD countries at a given point in time.
Only  a  few  (OECD,  1997;  Heitger,  1987;  Dowrick  1993)  constructs  pooled  time-
series/cross-country data. This increases the number of observations to about 60 and makes
it possible to take unobserved country effects into account.  Second, industrial relations do
change over time but only slowly in response to political and economic conditions.'3 This
raising the question of simultaneity biases as, in the long run, the pressure from emerging
economic  conditions  can call  for a  reconsideration of the institutional  framework. The
literature; on the whole, ignores this  feedback and assumes that it is institutional factors
that affect economic indicators and not vice versa.14
"See, e.g., Dowrick  (1993) and Nickell  and Layard  (1999).
12See e.g., Layard  et al (1991) and Scarpetta  (1996).
13It  is obvious from the experience of New Zealand and the UK that labor reforms can change the
institutional  framework  of collective  bargaining  significantly.  However,  changing  economic  condition  may
have ihe same  effect. For instance,  centralized  collective  bargaining  or even social  partnership  may, in some
countries,  have been a reasonable  way to deal with the major supply  side shocks of the 1970s,  while more
decentralized  bargaining structures  are better able to accommodate  the challenge  of globalization in the
1990s. Therefore, the tendency to decentralize  collective  bargaining  in some OECD countries (such as
Sweden  and Denmark)  can be seen as an endogenous  response  to changing  economic  conditions.
14 An exception is OECD (1997). They report that the "causality"  runs from bargaining institutions  to
economic  performance.
23It  is, therefore,  clear  that  one  should  be  careful  not  to  read  too  much  into the
empirical  results.  To  reflect  this,  we  focus  on  the  qualitative  impact  (i.e.  positive  or
negative), if any, of collective bargaining on economic performance'5 and stress that cross-
country analysis can tell  us little about the underlying  causal relationship.  At  best'  the
analysis can identify empirical regularities that could be made subject to further theoretical
or empirical research. With this in mind, we now turn to the evidence.
3.3  UNION  DENSITY  AND BARGAINING  COVERAGE
The relationship between union density and  bargaining coverage  and a variety of
economic performance indicators has been examined extensively. Table 8 summarizes the
findings of the relevant studies with respect to union  density. For each study, the Table
contains information about the time period for which the study is relevant (column one);
the economic  performance  indicator(s)  under  investigation  (column  two);  the  control
variables, if any, used (column three); the estimation approach (column four). In column
five, we summarize the main results of the study.
'I We use the 10  percent  level  to judge the statistical  significance  of the estimated  effects.
24Table  8. Union Density  and Economic Performance  in the OECD Countries:  A
Summary  of Relevant  Studies
Study and years  Performance indicator  Control  Estimation approach  Result
variables
OECD (1997)  Unemploymnent  rate  Bargaining  Regression  Union density increases the
1980-94  Inflation  coverage  approach with  employment rate but has no effect
Employment rate  OECD1997-  pooled cross-  on the unemployment rate, inflation,
Real earnings  3  country data set.  and real earnings growth. Union
growth  density reduces earnings inequality.
Earnings inequality
OECD (1997)  Unemployment rate  Non  Correlation  Union density reduces earnings
1980-94  Inflation  approach; three  inequality in 1990 and 1994. Weak
Employment rate  points in time:  indication of a positive relationship
Real earnings  1980, 1990 and  between union density and the
growth  1994.  employment rate and a negative
Earnings inequality  relationship between union density
and real earnings growth in 1980 but
not in other years.
Freeman  Unemployment rate  C1985  Regression  Union density has no effect on the
(1988)  Employment rate  Wage  approach with  unemployment rate, the employment
1979-85  Compensation  dispersion  cross-country data  rate, and compensation.
Others
Scarpetta  Unemployment rate  CD1988  Regression  Union density increases
(1996)  LNJ 1991-1  approach with  unemployment, in particular youth
1983-93  LNJ1991-2  cross country data  and long-term unemployment but no
control for bargaining coverage is
made.
Nickell and  Unemployment  LNJ 1991-1  Regression  Union density increases total
Layard  Labor supply  LNJ1991-2  approach with  unemployment but has no separate
(1999) and  Productivity  Bargaining  (pooled) cross  effect on short- and long-term
Nickell  growth  coverage  country data  unemployment. Union density has
(1997), 1983-  Others  no effect on labor supply, and
88,  productivity growth.
1989-94
Bean et al  Adjustment speed  BS1985  Two-step  Union density has no effect on
(1986)  Real wage  regression  adjustment speed (to wage shocks)
1956-85  flexibility  approach  and real wage flexibility.
Layard et al  Real wage  CD1988  Two-step  Union density has no effect on real
(1991)  flexibility  LNJ1991-1  regression  wage flexibility.
1980-94  LNJ1991-2  approach
T1986
Others
Scarpetta  Hysteresis in  CD 1988  Two-step  Union density increases
(1996)  unemployment  LNJI991-1  regression  unemployment persistence but no
1970-93  LNJI991-2  approach  control for bargaining coverage is
made.
Note: Union density = the number of workers who are members of a union, as a percentage of all workers,
unionized and non-unionized.  For more information on the indicators of bargaining coordination in column
three, see Table 6. "Adjustment speed" is the mean adjustment speed of employment to a real wage shock.
25Union density appears to  have little or  no  impact  on  comparative  labor market
performance, once bargaining coverage and bargaining coordination have been controlled
for" 6 with on one significant exception: Union density is associated with a compression of
the wage distribution and a reduction in earnings inequality. This tendency is also found in
microeconomic studies (see, e.g., Freeman, 1980b; and Gosling and Machin, 1993).
It is evident from Table 9 that the picture looks different for bargaining coverage."
After  controlling  for  union  density  and  bargaining  coordination,  countries  with  high
bargaining coverage (such  as Austria,  France and  Finland),  ceteris paribus,  experience
higher unemployment rates, lower employment rates,  and  more  inflation than countries
with  low  bargaining  coverage  (such  as  the  US,  Japan  and  Canada).  Moreover,  high
bargaining coverage seems to increase the supply of labor but has no effect on productivity
(Nickell and  Layard,  1999). Finally, as for  union  density, high  bargaining  coverage  is
associated a reduction in earnings inequality.
16 Blanchflower  (1  996),  who uses  country-specific  microeconomic  data to analyze  OECD countries,  find
similar  results.
17 The layout  of the Table  is similar  to Table 8.
26Table 9. Bargaining Coverage and Economic Performance: A Summary of Relevant
Studies
Study  and  Performance  Control  Estimation  Result
years  indicator  variables  approach
OECD  (1997)  Unemployrnent  rate  Union  Regression  approach  Bargaining  coverage  increases
1980-94  Inflation  density  with  pooled cross-  unemployment,  inflation  and real
Employment  rate  OECD  1997  country  data set.  earnings  growth,  and  reduces  the
Real earnings  -3  employment  rate and earnings
growth  inequality.
Earnings  inequality
OECD  (1997)  Unemployment  rate  Non  Correlation  approach  Bargaining  coverage  increases
1980-94  Inflation  at three  points in  unemployment  only in 1994,
Employment  rate  time: 1980, 1990  and  reduces  the employment  rate in oi
Real earnings  1994.  1990  and 1994,  and earnings
growth  inequality  in 1994.  Otherwise  it h
Earnings  inequality  no impact  on economic
performance.
Jackman  Unemployment  rate  LNJ  1991-1  Regression  approach  Bargaining  coverage  increases
(1993)  LNJ  1991-2  with  cross country  unemployment
1983-88  Others  data
Nickell  and  Unemployment  rate  LNJ  1991  -1  Regression  approach  Bargaining  coverage  increases  bo
Layard  Labor  supply  LNJ  1991-2  with  cross-country  short-  and long-term  unemploymi
(1999),  Productivity  Union  data  and labor  supply  but has  no effeci
Nickell  growth  density  on productivity  growth.
(1997)  Others
1989-94
Note: Bargaining  coverage  = The number  of workers,  unionized  or not, which  have  their pay and employment
conditions  determined  by a collective agreement,  as a  percentage of all workers, unionized and non-
unionized.  For more  information  on the indicators  of bargaining  coordination  in column  three,  see Table  6.
One interpretation of these findings is that when collective agreements are extended
to  non-unionized  sectors,  worker/management  cooperation  and  other  productivity-
enhancing "voice" factors do not compensate the economic costs associated with the wage
mark-up and other aspects of the contracts. If this interpretation is correct, the negative
correlation between coverage and (some measures of)  economic performance cannot be
taken as evidence of harmful and distorting union activities. On the contrary, it indicates
that unions can serve a useful and productive purpose where they are allowed to develop.
273.4  BARGAINING COORDINATION  AND COMPARATIVE  ECONOMIC  PERFORMANCE:  THE BIG
PICTURE
We  have  surveyed  26  studies  that  examine the relationship between  bargaining
coordination  and  economic  performance. 8  The  literature  focuses  on  two  main
hypothesizes:
Hypothesis  1.  Coordinated  collective  bargaining  leads  to  better
economic outcomes than semi-coordinated collective bargaining, which,
in turn, performs better than uncoordinated collective bargaining.
Hypothesis  2.  (The  hump  hypothesis)  Semi-coordinated  collective
bargaining leads to worse economic outcomes than both coordinated and
uncoordinated collective bargaining (Calmfors and Driffill, 1988).
To structure the discussion and to synthesize the evidence in a systematic way, we
undertake a "meta-analysis" of the knowledge embodied in these studies.' 9 To this end, we
divide the 26  studies  into  125 sub-studies.  The unit of analysis (a  sub-study) then is a
relationship  between a specific indicator of bargaining coordination (defined in Table 6)
vis-a-vis  a  specific  economic  indicator. 20 Although  this  approach  is  associated  with
multiple problems, it has the advantage over a more traditional survey that it allows for a
systematic evaluation of the evidence. 2"
18See Cameron (1984), OECD (1988, 1997), Rowthorn (1992a; 1992b), Freeman (1988), Tarantelli (1986),
Bruno and  Sachs  (1985),  Crouch (1985,  1990), Bleaney (1996). Heitger (1987), Jackman (1993), Golden
(1993), McCallum  (1983,  1986), Dowrick (1993), Calmfors and Driffill (1988), Soskice (1990), Scarpetta
(1996),  Cameron (1984), Bean (1994),  Blau and Kahn (1996), Zweimuller and Barth (1994), Nickell and
Layard (1999), and Nickell (1997).
'5  See, e.g., van den Bergh et al (1997, chapter 3) for an introduction to meta-analysis.
20 Each sub-study is characterized in terms of the econometric methodology (estimation approach) and the
type of data set (cross-country or pooled cross country data set) used to estimate it, the time period
considered, the type of test, if any, used to test the hump hypothesis, and the type of control variables used.
Doing this makes it possible to analyze if the underlying attributes of the studies (such as the econometric
methodology, the data material, and the time period) have any systematic influence on the pattern of results.
The full data set (of sub-studies) can be found in Aidt and Tzannatos (1999, Appendix 3).
2'Aidt and Tzannatos (1999, Appendix 2) contains a detailed summary of each of the 26 studies.
283.4.1  Does bargaining coordination matter for  economic outcomes?
The indicators of bargaining coordination focus on multiple aspects of collective
bargaining  (see section 3.1.2). It is, therefore,  a reasonable starting point to ask what we
learn  from  the  26  studies  about the  combined  impact of  centralization,  concentration,
informal coordination, and corporatism on different dimensions of economic perfornance.
We summarize the findings of the  125 sub-studies in Table  10 as a rough "vote count."
Column one  lists the relevant macroeconomic performance indicators. Column two lists
the hypothesized  relationship between the relevant performance indicator and bargaining
coordination:  positive  (+),  negative  (-),  U-shaped  (U),  Hump-shaped  (H),  and  no
relationship  (N). The colurnns headed  "rate  1",  "rate 2"  and "evaluation of evidence"
summarize  the  empirical  findings.  "Rate  1" is  the proportion of  sub-studies that  find
evidence in support of the hypothesized relationship, and "rate 2" is the proportion of sub-
studies that test for and find evidence of a hump- or U-shaped relationship.
In the aggregate, about 60% of the sub-studies support the view that bargaining
coordination  affects economic outcomes in the predicted way. 22 However, as is evident
from Table  10, there is significant variation in the level of confidence that we can place
upon  the  relationship  between  individual  macroeconomic  performance  indicators  and
bargaining  coordination. 23 Countries with  coordinated collective bargaining tend, ceteris
paribus,  to  have  lower  unemployment  rates  than  other  countries.  Studies  that  use
composite measures of unemployment (such as Okun's index and the open economy index)
confirm this tendency. The confidence in this  finding is somewhat mitigated by the fact
that  very  few  (about one-third)  of  the relevant  sub-studies find  a  positive relationship
between the employmnent  rate and bargaining coordination. We would expect the reduction
22Only  two  of the 125  sub-studies  find  results  that are  at variance  with  the predictions  of economic  theory.
The first of these is obtained  by OECD  (1997) and suggests that the employment rate is low in countries with
high levels of bargaining coordination. The result is based on a simple correlation between the employment
rate and OECD1997-3. The Spearman correlation is significant at the 10% level but only for 1994. For the
years 1980 and  1990, the relationship is insignificant. Hence, the result is not very robust. The second result,
obtained by Bean (1994), suggests that a high level of employee coordination (measured by LNJI991-1)  is
associated with high unemployment. However, if the combined effect of employer and employee coordination
is taken into account, the correlation is negative.
23Clearly,  if there  is  a tendency  not  to report  insignificant  results, then  the evidence overstates the true
significance of the relationship.
29in  the unemployment  rate to  have shown  up as a  higher employment  rate.  This  seem,
however, not to be the case. The most robust result is that countries with a high level of
bargaining  coordination tend to have a more compressed wage distribution.  This finding
can be  attributed  to  a number  of causes, including  egalitarian bargaining; the  fact that
centralized bargaining reduces the scope for firm- and/or industry-specific factors to enter
wage  contracts;  or  to  insurance  motives  (Agell  and  Lommerud,  1992).  Furthermore,
Rowthorn  (1992a;  1992b) argues  that  wage  dispersion  is  a proxy  for job  quality,  He
provides evidence that both the quantity of jobs (a high employment rate) and the quality of
jobs (low wage dispersion) is higher in countries with coordinated collective bargaining.
30Table  10. Bargaining Coordination and Economic Outcomes: A Summary and Evaluation
of Results
Performance  Hypothesis 4 Rate 12  Rate 23  Evaluation of evidence
indicator'
%  ni  %  n 2
The unemployment  -/ H  70  40  44  16  Evidence of a negative relationship. Little
rate  evidence of a hump-shaped relationship.
Inflation  - / H  30  20  9  11  Little evidence of any relationship.
The employment  +/ U  42  12  36  11  Weak evidence of a U-shaped relationship.
rate  I
Okun's index  -/ H  75  12  100  2  Some evidence of a hump-shaped relationship but
most of the evidence suggests that the relationship
_  _  is negative  .
Real compensation  -/ H  56  9  20  5  Evidence of a negative relationship. Almost no
growth  evidence of a hump-shaped relationship.
Productivity  + / U  38  9  50  6  Weak evidence of a U-shaped relationship.
growth  _
Open economy  - / H  50  8  100  2  Some evidence of a hump-shaped relationship but
index  most of the evidence suggests that the relationship
is negative .
Wage dispersion  +  100  7  n.a.  n.a.  Strong evidence of a positive  relationship.
Earnings inequality  +  80  5  20  5  Strong evidence of a positive relationship.
Index of job  +  100  2  n.a.  n.a.  Some evidence of a positive relationship.
quality
6
Labor supply  +  100  1  n.a.  n.a.  Some evidence of a positive  relationship.
Source: constructed from Appendix 2 and 3 in Aidt and Tzannatos (1999).
Notes:
All relationships are reported with reference to an increase in bargaining coordination.  For example, a positive
relationship means that the economic indicator increases as bargaining coordination  increases, and  a  U-shaped
relationship  means that  the  economic indicator decreases  at  first  and  then  starts  rising  at  higher  levels  of
coordination.
(1)  The performance indicators are either in levels (typically decade averages) or in first differences.
(2)  Rate  I = the proportion of sub-studies that find evidence of the expected relationship, and n,  is the total
number of sub-studies that investigate the relevant relationship.
(3)  Rate 2 = the proportion of sub-studies that test for and find evidence of a hump- or U-shaped relationship,
and n2 is total number of sub-studies that perform a test for a hump- or U-shaped relationship.
(4)  In column 2, we indicate for each of the 11 economic outcomes what economic theory predicts about the
relationship between the particular economic performance indicator and bargaining coordination.
(5)  n,  is the total number of sub-studies that investigate the relevant relationship, and n2 is the total number of
sub-studies that perform a test of the hump hypothesis.
(6)  "Index of job quality" is the difference between the employment rate and wage dispersion (coefficient of
variation) (see Rowthorn, 1992a; 1992b).
In  Table  10, we  attribute equal  weight  to  all  sub-studies  irrespectively  of  the
estimation approach and data material used. To judge the robustness of the results reported
in the Table, we pool all sub-studies irrespective of macroeconomic indicator and divide
31them  into three  groups. In  the  first  group,  we  include  studies  that  use  the correlation
approach. In the second group, we include those studies that use the regression approach to
analyze cross-country data. The third group contains those studies that apply the regression
approach to analyze pooled cross-country data. Table 11 summarizes the results for each
group as percentages of the sub-studies that do (and do not) find evidence of the predicted
relationship between economic performance (in general) and bargaining coordination.
Table 11. Percentage of Sub-studies that Find a Relationship between Bargaining
Coordination and Economic Outcomes, Disaggregated according to the Estimation
Approach and Data Material Used
Correlation  Regression  Regression  approach  Regression
approach  approach  with  with pooled  cross  approach,  total
cross country  data  country  data
Relationship  73%  53%  6  7%  5_7%
No relationship  27%  47%  33%  X_43%  =
Number  of sub-  53  50  22  72
studies  |  ___  X  _
Note:  We construct  the table  by pooling  the  results  for the economic  indicators  and calculate  the percentage
of sub-studies  that  finds  a relationship  (or no relationship)  for each  of the three  groups.  We construct  the
information  in  the last  column  ("regression  approach,  total")  from  data  on all sub-studies  using  the  regression
approach  irrespective  of  the data  used.
It is clear from the Table that the studies based on the correlation approach find
statistically  significant  relationships  more  often  than  those  that  use  more  advanced
statistical techniques.  Unsurprisingly, this suggests that the more and better we control for
cross-country differences  in  economic  policy,  in  the  institutional  environment, and  in
economic  conditions,  the  harder  it  is  to  detect  a  relationship  between  bargaining
coordination and economic performance. This tendency, however,  becomes less apparent
when  the  quality  of  the  underlying  data  material  is  taken  into  account.  Overall,  we
conclude that there are good reasons to believe that the simple "vote count" of Table i0
exaggerates the importance of bargaining coordination in shaping economic outcomes.
3.4.2  Testing the hump hypothesis
The hump hypothesis  has been explicitly tested in a number of studies (Caimfors
and Driffill, 1988; Freeman, 1988; OECD, 1988, 1997; Dowrick,  1993) accounting for 58
of the 125 sub-studies. Overall, the evidence in favor of the hypothesis is weak: only 21 out
32of  the  58  sub-studies  can  statistically  "confirm"  it.  The  evidence  for  individual
performance indicators is summarized in Table 10 by "rate 2" and is, at best, mixed. The
view  that  semi-coordinated  bargaining  systems  are  associated  with  a  relatively  high
unemployment rate  is supported  by fewer than half the relevant  sub-studies,  while the
evidence of a U-shaped relationship between bargaining coordination and the employment
rate is much weaker. Half of sub-studies concerned with productivity growth find evidence
of a U-shaped relationship between bargaining coordination and productivity growth, but is
based on an uncomfortably small number of sub-studies. 24
To investigate the robustness of the results, we pool the 58 relevant sub-studies and
divide them into three groups according to the test procedure used to test for the hump. A
similar  decomposition is  done  with  respect  to  estimation  approach.  The  results  are
summarized in Table 12.
Three test procedures have been used to test the hump hypothesis. In the ranking
test,  countries are ranked such that those that have coordinated bargaining  systems and
those  that  have  uncoordinated  systems are ranked  above  those  with  semi-coordinated
bargaining  systems  (Calmfors  and  Driffill,  1988: 22-23).  This  (new)  ranking  is  then
examined against the relevant macroeconomic performance indicator. In the quadratic test,
the institutional indicator (of interest) and its square are included in a regression model and
their significance tested. This test is more flexible than the ranking test in the sense that it
does not assume symmetry, and it does not rely on a  somewhat arbitrary reordering of
countries, but, as in the ranking test, the relevant institutional indicator is (mistakenly) used
as a cardinal variable. The dummy variable test is performed by dividing the countries into
three groups (coordinated, semi-coordinated, and uncoordinated countries) and including a
dummy variable for two  of the  groups in the  relevant regression  model.  As  with  the
24  Dowrick (1993) explains the  U-shaped relationship between productivity growth and  bargaining
coordination  as follows. Whether or not unions welcome or fight productivity-enhancing  changes (new
machinery  or new  working  practices)  depends  on the elasticity  of labor  demand.  If labor  demand  is inelastic,
then unions are likely  to fight productivity-enhancing  changes because  they would lead to lay-offs.  Hence,
institutional  changes  that reduce  the elasticity  of labor  demand,  such as a move from firm-level  bargaining  to
industry-level  bargaining,  mobilize unions to oppose technological  progress and, ultimately,  productivity
growth  may  be relatively  low  in a semi-centralized  bargaining  system.
J3ranking test, the main problem with this test is the arbitrariness of the classification. The
virtue is that it avoids using bargaining coordination as a cardinal variable (OECD, 1997).
From Table 12, we see that the main conclusion remains; irrespective of which test
procedure is used, the evidence in favor of the hump hypothesis is weak. 25 In addition, the
underlying estimation approach does not have any systematic influence on the results.
Table 12. Percentage of Sub-studies Testing the Hump Hypothesis that Find a
Relationship between Bargaining Coordination and Economic Outcomes,
Disaggregated According Test Procedure and Estimation Approach Used
Different  test specification'  Different  estimation
approaches 2
Dummy  variable  Quadratic  Ranking  Correlation  Regression
test  test  Test
Hump/U-shaped  11%  40%  41%  35%  38%
relationship  I
No relationship  44%  60%  45%  46%  53%
Monotonic  relationship  44%  0%  14%  19%  9%
Number  of sub-studies  9  20  29  26  32
Note: (1)  For each  of the  tests,  the  null  hypothesis  is that  there  is no  hump/U-shaped  relationship. The
alternative hypothesis is that the relationship  is hump/U-shaped. (2) We construct the frequency distribution
by pooling the results for the  macroeconomic  indicators  and calculate the  percentage  of "hump/U-shaped
relationships," "no relationships," and  "monotonic relationships" respectively, for each of the groups of sub-
studies.
An interesting pattern emerges when studies that focus on the 1970s and 1980s are
compared with more recent studies that focus on the 1990s. While the studies that analyze
the 1970s and the  1980s (Cameron,  1984; Calmfors and Driffill,  1988; Tarantelli, 1986)
tend to support the view that bargaining  coordination affects macroeconomic conditions,
the  support  is  much  weaker  for  the  1990s  (OECD,  1997).26 This  suggests  that  the
25 The dummy variable test detects less "humps" and "Us" than the ranking and the quadratic test, however.
This supports the view that the "true relationship" is more likely to be monotone (if not constant) than hump-
or U-shaped. The dummy variable test basically compares the average performance of the three groups of
countries using the group of countries with uncoordinated bargaining systems as the baseline. If the true
relationship between, say, unemployment and bargaining coordination is only slightly hump-shaped, then the
difference between the average performance of countries with uncoordinated and semi-coordinated
bargaining systems is rather small. Accordingly, the dummy variable test has a hard time detecting a "hump."
The quadratic test and the ranking test, on the other hand, are more likely to detect it. Moreover, the evidence
in Table 12 suggests that the latter two may be equally effective in doing so.
26  Dowrick (1993) can only find  a U-shaped  relationship between total factor productivity and bargaining
coordination  in  the  1960s  and  1970s.  In  the  1980s,  he  can  not  identify  any  statistically  significant
relationship. It would be interesting to extent this study to the 1  990s.
34relationship between bargaining  coordination and macroeconomic performance has been
less  pronounced  in  the  1  990s.  This  is  not  entirely  surprising.  In  fact,  the  observed
differences between different  labor market  systems in the  1970s and  1980s may simply
reflect  differences  in  their  capacities  to  adopt  to  the  supply  shocks of  1970s and the
disinflationary  policies  of  the  1980s.  In  the  more  stable  enviromnent  of  the  1990s,
bargaining  coordination  has  becomes  less  important  relative  to  other  determinants of
macroeconomics  performance.  This  suggests  that  the  static  benefits  of  bargaining
coordination might not be that large, while the dynamic benefits show up more clearly in
the  evidence.  This  observation  is  supported  by  the  fact  that,  in  the  relatively  stable
environment  of  the  1960s,  countries  with  widely  different  bargaining  systems  were
performing equally well. The reduction of the importance of bargaining coordination, as a
determinant of economic performance,  in recent  times, is also related to changes in the
economic  environment.  For  example,  globalization  has  exposed  many  industries  to
significant international competition and changes in industry  structure and the legislative
framework in which  collective bargaining takes place  have increased the importance of
nonunionized labor markets in many OECD countries (most notably in the UK and New
Zealand).  Both  of  these  tendencies  can help  explain  why  bargaining coordination has
become less important. 2"
3.5  BARGAINING COORDINATION  AND THE FLEXIBILITY  OF THE LABOR  MARKET
The evidence discussed so far focuses on the link between cross-country differences
in economic outcomes  and bargaining coordination. The studies reviewed in this section
ask a different question: how is bargaining coordination related to labor market flexibility?
Labor market flexibility is a fuzzy concept but can be measured by indicators such as real
wage flexibility, adjustment speed to wage shocks, unemployment persistence, and search
effectiveness of  unemployed workers.  Seven  studies  have used  the two-step  regression
approach  to  estimate  these  indicators  and  have  investigated  their  relationship  with
bargaining coordination. Table 13 summarizes the results.
27  Empirically,  OECD (1997) and Crouch (1990) find evidence that supports the view that exposure  to
international  competition  disciplines unions and reduces the performance differences  between different
bargaining  systems.
35Table 13. Labor Market Flexibility: Four Measures and their Relationship to
Bargaining Coordination
Measure  Predicted  relationship  Summary  of evidence
Real wage  flexibility  +  Most  evidence  indicates  that  real wages  are more  flexible  (i.e.  respond
more to changes in employment) where bargaining coordination is high.
Hysteresis  H  The  evidence  suggests  that  hysteresis  is associated  with employee
coordination in semi-coordinated wage bargaining systems.
Adjustment  speed  +  The  adjustrnent  speed  of employment  to a wage shock is higher  where
I bargaining coordination is high.
Search  effectiveness  +  The  level  of unemployment  consistent  with a given vacancy  level is
lower  where  bargaining  coordination  is high, i.e., search  effectiveness  is
higher.
Note: See Layard et al (1991); McCallum (1986); Newell and Symons (1987); Bean et al (1986);  Scarpetta
(1996); Alogoskoufis and Manning (1988); and Jacknan  et al (1990).
The  two  most  interesting  results  related  to  (real)  wage  flexibility  and  to
unemployment persistency (hysteresis). First, hysteresis can arise because of membership
effects (Blanchard and Summers, 1986), because of loss of skills and discouraged-worker
effects, and because of depreciation of capital during recession that does not fully recover
subsequently or takes a long time doing so (Rowthorn, 1995). Layard et al (1991) find that
employer  coordination  reduces  persistence  while  employee  coordination  increases  it.
Subsequent research by Scarpetta (1996) suggests that the employer effect is, on average,
greater  and  that  unemployment  in  countries with  semi-coordinated bargaining  systems
shows a relatively high  degree of persistence. In addition, Jackman et al (1990) provide
evidence that the search effectiveness of unemployed workers is higher in countries with
highly coordinated collective bargaining, suggesting that high bargaining  coordination is
associated with smaller discouraged-worker effects. Second, the evidence suggests that the
(bargained)  real  wage  is  more responsive  to  employment conditions  where  bargaining
coordination is high (Layard et al, 1991; and Bean et al, 1986). This combined  with the
faster adjustment to shocks bring support to the notion that bargaining coordination helps
the labor market  absorb  shocks fast and at a  low employment cost.  This  conclusion  is
further supported by a recent study by Blanchard and Wolfers (2000). They show that it is
the  interaction  between  shocks and  institutions  that  is crucial  for  the  observed  cross-
country and time series variation in unemployment in the OECD over the last 40 years.
363.6  DISSECTING BARGAINING  COORDINATION
Disentangling  the  macroeconomic  impact  of  different  aspects  of  bargaining
coordination is statistically hard and, in the presence of strong complementarities,  it may
even be misleading to attempt to do so. With this in mind, we review what can be learned
from the literature about individual aspects of bargaining coordination.
3.6.1  Formal andi nformal bargaining coordination
Informal bargaining coordination is an important phenomenon in countries such as
Japan,  Germany,  and,  to  some  extent,  Switzerland.  To  investigate  the  importance  of
informal coordination as  opposite to formal coordination, we divide the sub-studies  into
two  groups.  In the  first  group,  we  include  those  sub-studies that  use  an  indicator  of
bargaining  coordination  that  focuses  exclusively  on  formal  aspects  of  bargaining
coordination (such as centralization and union concentration) and in the second group, we
include  those  that use  an  indicator that also take  into account informal  coordination. 28
Table 14 summarizes the results.
Table 14. Percentage of All Sub-studies that Find a Relationship between Bargaining
Coordination and Economic Outcomes, Disaggregated According to Formal and
Informal Bargaining Coordination
Formal  bargaining  Formal  and informal
=_______________  coordination  only  bargaining  coordination
Relationship  70%  51 %
No relationship  30%  49%
Number  of sub-  84  41
studies
Note: We construct  the Table by pooling  the results  from all 125  sub-studies  and
calculate  the percentage  of relationships  (or no relationships)  for each of the two groups.
We  see  that  the  linkage  between  bargaining  coordination  and  economic
performance is more  discernible when the focus is on formal coordination  only.  When
informal aspects of bargaining coordination are taken into account, fewer sub-studies find
statistically significant relationships. This pattern becomes even clearer when we restrict
attention to those sub-studies that test the hump hypothesis, as is evident from  Table 15.
28 The indicators  that take into account  both fonnal and informal  coordination  are the seven indicators  listed
at the top of Table  6.
37This implies that, unless one controls for the degree of informal coordination, the observed
difference in  performance between  countries  with  different formal  bargaining  systems
looks larger than it really is (see also Soskice, 1990).
Table 15. Percentage of Sub-studies Testing the Hump Hypothesis that Find a
Relationship between Bargaining Coordination and Economic Outcomes,
Disaggregated According to Formal and Informal Bargaining Coordination
Formal  bargaining  coordination  Formal  and infonnal  bargaining
only  coordination
Hump/U-shaped  relationship  58%  11%
No relationship  39%  63%
Monotonic  relationship  3%  26%
Number  of sub-studies  31  27
Note: We construct  the table by pooling  the results from the 58 relevant sub-studies  and calculate
the percentage of "hump/U-shaped relationship," "no relationships," and "monotonic relationships'
for each of the two groups of sub-studies.
These  findings  suggest  that  informal  coordination  can  help  remove  the
disadvantage  associated  with  formal,  semi-coordinated  bargaining.  However,  since
informal coordination by its very nature is not embodied in institutions or laws, instability
is an important issue and informal coordination  has a  strong tendency to  break down in
times of rapid  economic and  social  change. Although  it is  useful  to think  of  informal
coordination  as  a  substitute  for  formal  coordination,  the  two  aspects  of  bargaining
coordination are certainly not perfect substitutes.
3.6.2  Employer versus employee coordination
Jackman (1993), Bean (1994), and Scarpetta (1996) analyze the relative importance
of  employee  and  employer  coordination. 29 Using  different  control  variables  and  time
periods, all three studies strongly indicate that  employer coordination is more important
than employee coordination in accounting for comparative unemployment performance. In
other words,  while more employer  coordination  always leads  to  lower  unemployment,
more  employee  coordination  has  a  much  smaller  effect  (Jackman,  1993),  no  effect
(Scarpetta, 1996), or can even lead to higher unemployment  (Bean, 1994). This  finding
may be related to the fact that employers'  organizations, at successively higher bargaining
29 Employee coordination is measured by index LNJ1991-1 and employer coordination by LNJl991-2.  The
correlation between the two is 0.65, which suggests that multicollinearity may be a problem.
38levels, are more effective than unions  in controlling wage drift. If so, wage competition
among firmns  and the pressure on individual firms to give in to unions'  wage demands are
both reduced.
3.7  THE INTERACTION  BETWEEN  UNION DENSITY, BARGAINING  COVERAGE AND
COORDINATION
The interaction between bargaining coordination, density and coverage is important
for  the  understanding of  the  relationship  between  collective  bargaining  and  economic
performance, and that they are highly correlated is clear from Table  16. The Table shows
the rank  correlation between  selected indicators  of  bargaining  coordination,  and union
density and bargaining coverage, respectively.
Table 16. The Rank Correlation between Selected Indicators of Bargaining Coordination,
Union Density, and Bargaining Coverage
Bargaining centralization  Corporatism  Employee or employer  Informal and formal
coordinatiton  coordination
CD1988  OECD1997  C1984-1  S1981-1  BS1985  1986  LNJ19911-  LNJ1991-2  OECD1997-  S1990-1
Union densitv  0.71  .44  .8.8  0.65  .. 34  2  0.25  0.65.  043  0.23  0.32
Bargaining coverage 0.70  .75  .57  .46  0.46  0.24  56  43  0.42  0.17
Source:  OECD (1997: Table 3.4; Table 3.3) and own calculations.
Notes:  (1) See Table 6, for a more precise definition of the  10 indicators of bargaining coordination.
(2) Significance  levels:  ***=I%;  **= 5%;  and *=  10%.
Overall, countries with highly coordinated collective bargaining tend to have high
union density and high  bargaining  coverage. 30 This  pattern  is  particularly  clear for the
group of indicators that focuses on bargaining centralization and employee and employer
coordination. Those indicators that focus on informal coordination are, with one exception,
not  strongly  correlated with  union  density  and  bargaining  coverage.  This  shows that
centralization  of  collective  bargaining  requires  high  union  density  or,  at  least, high
bargaining coverage. Informal coordination (e.g., between employers as in Japan), on the
other hand, can develop  and  play  an  important role  in an  environment  where a  small
30A few outliers should be  pointed  out. France has  a relatively coordinated  bargaining  system, yet union
density (but not coverage) is very low. Likewise, Japan combines a relatively coordinated  bargaining system
with low union density and coverage (see Table 4 and Table 7).
39proportion  of the  workforce is  unionized  and where  formal collective agreements only
cover a minority of workers.
Jackman  (1993),  Nickell  and  Layard  (1999),  and  Nickell  (1997)  analyze  the
interaction  between the three aspects of collective bargaining and economic performance.
They confirm the finding that bargaining coverage (and, to a lesser extent, union density)
has a negative effect on unemployment at a given level of bargaining coordination and that
bargaining  coordination  has  a positive  impact  on unemployment  for  given bargaining
coverage. 3"  More interestingly, as  bargaining coverage and bargaining coordination (tend
to)  increase  together  (Table  16), the  increase  in  coordination  counteracts the  adverse
impact on economic performance of increasing bargaining coverage (and union density).
Moreover, Layard et al (1991: 137) argue that it is the failure of studies such as Calmfors
and Driffill  (1988) to take into account  the impact of bargaining  coverage on economic
performance  that  gives  the  (misleading)  impression  that  semi-coordinated  collective
bargaining  is "bad." More generally, these results underscore the danger of focusing on
individual  aspects of labor market  institutions  when it is the  interaction between many
different  aspects  that determines  outcomes.  Labor market  institutions  complement each
other and  a  comparison  between  different  "packages of  institutions"  may be  the most
sensible way to assess the macroeconomic performance of labor market institutions.
3.8  SOCIAL COHERENCE  AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE
In  a  corporatist  society,  the  political  activities  of  unions  and  employers'
organizations  take place within a  well-defined framework of social partnership between
workers,  capitalists,  and the  government.  Within  this  framework, labor market  parties,
particularly unions, expect the government to deliver certain welfare goods and policies in
exchange  for  wage  moderation  and  peace  in  the  labor  market.  Lange  and  Garrett
distinguish among four scenarios, which are summarized in Table 17.32
3' Union density is typically insignificant.
32See Lange and Garrett (1985); Garrett and Lange (1986); and Alvarez et al (1991).
40In scenario (1), unions are powerful, in the sense that the majority of workers are
Table 17. The Garrett and Lange Hypothesis of Coherence
Left-wing  govenmment  Right-wing  government
Unions  powerftul  (1) Good  economic  performance (3)  Bad  economic  performance
Unions  weak  (4)  Bad  economic  performance  (2)  Good  economic  performance
unionized and bargaining is controlled by national organizations, and the government is
left-wing. Under these circumstances,  it is predicted that economic performance will be
"good". This is because the pursuit of welfare policies by left-wing parties is likely to lead
to  voluntary  wage moderation.  Moreover,  as  pointed  out  by  Olson  (1982),  if  unions
organize the majority of workers, they are less likely to engage in wasteful rent-seeking.
This is because unionized workers are going to bear most of the costs associated with these
activities themselves. In scenario (2), unions are politically weak, in the  sense that union
density is low and bargaining is  decentralized,  and  the government  is righwing. Under
these circumstances, it is also predicted that economic performance will be "good". This is
because unions are restricted in their wage demands by competitive pressure from product
markets which are left unregulated by the righ-wing government. In scenario (3) and (4),
economic performance is expected to be "bad," because there is a mismatch between the
power  of the  labor movement  and  the  political  orientation  of the  government. If,  for
instance, a righ-wing government coexisting with powerful unions, unions are unlikely to
restrict their wage demands voluntarily, as they cannot expect the government to deliver
any welfare goods in return. Likewise, a left-wing government coexisting with weak unions
cannot count on any voluntary wage  moderation because individual unions are likely to
pursue their own interests (wage pressure) without taking into account the economy-wide
consequences of their actions.
To test "the Garret and Lange hypothesis  of coherence,"  indictors of the political
orientation of the government and  indicators  of the organizational power  of unions are
interacted  in  a  multiple  regression  model.  Using  economic  growth  as  the  economic
performance indicator, the hypothesis finds some support in a sample of OECD countries
(Garrett and Lange, 1986; Lange and Garrett, 1985; and Alvarez et al, 1991).
414  CONCLUSION
The  evidence  on the  macroeconomic  impact  of collective bargaining  in  CECD
countries  is  too  weak  and  fragile to  warrant  generalizations. The interaction  cannot be
analyzed  in  isolation  from  the  general  economic  and  political  environment  in  which
bargaining takes place, as industrial relations develop endogenously in response to country-
specific economic, legal, and political  conditions. It is therefore dangerous to  extrapolate
results derived from average cross-country performance to specific countries. Nevertheless,
a number  of results do emerge. These are broadly in line with the findings of Flanagan
(1999) in his recent survey of the literature. The results are:
*  The hump  hypothesis receives  no support, except for selected indicators  such as
unemployment and productivity, and in these cases the evidence is not very robust.
The  view  that  that  countries  with  coordinated bargaining  systems, on  average,
performed  better  than countries  with  less  coordinated system in  the  1970s and
1980s receives some support but the differences seem to have disappeared in the
1  990s. This suggests that the static benefits of bargaining coordination might not be
that great, while the dynamic benefits seem to be larger.
- The most robust result relates to wage dispersion and earnings inequality: Countries
with coordinated collective bargaining tend to have less wage dispersion than other
countries.
- Cross-country  variation  in  union  density  has  little  impact  on  economic
performance. High bargaining coverage, on the other hand, tends to be associated
with relatively poor economic performance.
*  In -countries with high bargaining  coverage, the adverse impact on unemployment
can  be  counteracted  if  bargaining  takes  place  in  a  coordinated  fashion.  This
suggests that one  aspect of  collective bargaining cannot be analyzed in isolation
from other aspects. In other words, it seems to be the interaction between various
aspects of collective bargaining that determines the macroeconomic impact.
*  In countries that  lack formal  bargaining coordination (in the form of centralized
bargaining  between national organizations), informal bargaining coordination can
arise as a substitute. Instability of informal coordination makes it less than a perfect
substitute, though.
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